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1 Andrew  C.  Mertha’s  book  takes  us  into  the  world  of  large-scale  dam  projects  in
southwestern Chinese rivers. His research digs into resistance movements against some
of  these  projects  in  the  search for  answers  to  a  puzzling  phenomenon:  apparently
powerless  contenders  defeat  large-scale  industrial  developments  that  enjoy  the
outright support of the mighty Chinese party-state — a state that is arguable more in
control  of  all  means  of  coercion  than  any  other  non-totalitarian  polity  in  the
contemporary world.
2 This  phenomenon  recently  caught  widespread  attention  in  the  highly  publicised
protests against a Xiamen chemical plant project in 2007. Mertha’s cases, however, take
place a few years before “Xiamen PX.” The author provides careful fieldwork accounts
and novel ideas to make sense of them through a most-similar comparative design. The
three cases  in  his  study,  located  in  the  Dadu  River  (Pubugou)  and  the  Min  River
(Dujiangyan)  in  Sichuan,  and  in  the  Nu  River  in  Yunnan,  show  varying  levels  of
successful  resistance  (the  dependent  variable)  while  unfolding at  roughly  the  same
time (2003-2006) and place. Hence, broad structural changes alone, which affect all of
them  equally,  cannot  possibly  account  for  their  varying  success.  Consequently,
Mertha’s  argument,  which  he  summarizes  in  Chapter  1,  revolves  around  policy
entrepreneurship and issue framing.  Both can unfold because of  a  broad structural
feature  of  China’s  contemporary  polity,  which  Mertha  identifies  as  “fragmented
authoritarianism” – a framework previously coined by Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel
Oksenberg.  It  provides  “the  ‘spaces’  necessary  for  [policy  entrepreneurs]  to  exist
without being snuffed out by the coercive apparatus of the state” (p. 18). The book’s
main  argument  (pp.  18  ff)  thus  claims  that  policy  change  is  possible  when  policy
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entrepreneurship is high (his necessary condition), and while the framing tactics these
entrepreneurs engage in dominate the public sphere (his sufficient condition).
3 An unarguably outstanding aspect of Mertha’s analysis is that he situates discourse in a
very concrete institutional field. This makes language and the role of meaning-making
in the Chinese policy process tangible. The author can therefore convincingly argue
that  the  use  of  symbolic  devices  can  actually  result  in  very  concrete  policy  shifts.
Although language has been debated in relation to contention in China, the discursive
aspect  of  concrete cases  of  conflict  has  probably not  been examined in such detail
previously. This volume may thus be regarded as an additional step in establishing the
“politics of signification”1 in the field of China Studies.
4 Mertha argues that policy entrepreneurs appear in the form of “disgruntled officials,”
journalists,  or  NGOs  activists.2 His  entrepreneurs  come  across  highly  agentive  and
strategic:  “Policy  entrepreneurs  bide  their  time  until  chance  opportunities  arise,
perhaps indicating that they are not simply providing a solution in response to an
existing problem but waiting for the appropriate problem to arise … so that they can
plug in their already well-developed solutions” (p. 6). They promote their ideas mainly
through articulation – picking “symbols that can be packaged in such a way that they
offer an alternative perspective by which to understand and appreciate events, objects
and  situations”  –  and  amplification  --  “boiling  down  the  core  components  of  the
narrative in order to carry the frame from one set  of  individuals  to another” with
catchphrases, metaphors, or analogies (p. 7).
5 The author makes his  argument with the framing school  from contentious politics,
which  he  cites  in  explaining  that  the  most  important  function  of  framing  is  “to
mobilize” people (p. 14) – particularly those “outside of the core group of activists” (p.
15). Hence, when political entrepreneurs do their job well, their framing results in the
“expansion of the political sphere of conflict [and mobilises] coalitions and broad-based
support” (p. 16). Here Mertha relies on Paul A. Sabatier’s advocacy coalition framework.
3 Overall,  the  distinction  between  policy  entrepreneurship  and  issue  framing  is
somewhat blurred.  Policy entrepreneurs engage in articulation and amplification —
speech-action that essentially seems to be what framing is all about.
6 In  Chapter  2  the  author  outlines  the  issues  at  stake:  economic  development,
resettlement, cultural heritage, and environmental issues. Finally, Mertha introduces
the major actors, composed of government ministries and agencies at different levels,
government-organised (GO) NGOs, and environmental NGOs. Given the crucial role the
media play in the book’s argument, it is not entirely clear why they are absent from
this list.  The first  two chapters stretch over 64 pages;  it  sometimes seems that the
organisation  of  arguments  here  could  have  been  a  bit  more  straight-forward  and
condensed.
7 Chapters  3  to  5  analyse  his  three  cases  in  detail.  The first  case,  the  Pubugou Dam
project in Sichuan, involves a large-scale resettlement of a third of the surrounding
county’s population. Resistance, including large-scale and violent protests, was largely
caused by grievances over the very low compensation offered for the relocation of local
farmers.  Largely  spontaneous  and  lacking  any  apparent  strategic  planning,  it
ultimately failed to halt construction of the dam. In his explanation, Mertha points out
that in the three months before the protests occurred, some media reports about the
problems  of  resettlement  appeared  in  the  national  media.  Yet,  no  strategic  policy
entrepreneurship in  his  terms took place.  No attempts  to  co-opt  parts  of  the state
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bureaucracy and the media were undertaken. Mertha also believes that the framing of
the issue as a problem of social injustice contributed to the defeat of the opposition.4
According  to  him,  injustice  simply  lacked  “power  to  attract  the  broad  support
necessary for policy change” (p.  93),  because similar problems were experienced by
many Chinese and empathy was therefore difficult to invoke. As soon as mass protests
broke out, the state converted to repression mode, dispatching large-scale military and
police units and declaring the issue a threat to social  stability.  Once the event was
declared  political,  reporting  on  it  became  risky,  closing  all  doors  to  meaningful
adjustment, not to mention successful resistance. Pubugou consequently turned into a
politically highly sensitive non-event.
8 The unfolding of  events  in the case of  Dujiangyan,  Mertha’s  second case,  is  almost
diametrically opposite to what happened in Pubugou. The place is home to an ancient
irrigation system, a UNESCO world heritage site, and has since gained additional tragic
recognition  from the  2008  earthquake  that  buried  hundreds  of  children  under  the
rubble of their schools. The issue tookoff in 2000 with plans for a dam at the nearby
Zipingpu taking concrete shape.5 However, in 2003 local Dujiangyan officials discovered
what seemed to be preparations for a dam construction at Dujiangyan’s Yangliu Lake by
the  Zipingpu  developer.  Upon  discovering  the  secret  preparations,  Dujiangyan‘s
municipal government bureaus soon realised that they had many reasons to oppose the
project – the most striking one no doubt being tourism revenue-loss due to “vision
pollution”  (p.  100)  of  the  heritage  site.  Subsequently,  two  environmental  affairs
journalists  visiting  Sichuan were  “fed”  with  insider  information  by  the  Dujiangyan
World Heritage Office.  Their  report  was the birth of a  frame arguing that the dam
would endanger China’s national cultural heritage. It was the first among a small flood
of media reports that picked up this frame and finally caused the project to be shelved
by October 2003. Mertha argues that the cultural heritage theme resonated with the
Chinese public, effortless tying into “larger notions of nationalism, the one ‘ism’ that
Beijing has allowed to coexist alongside Marxism” (p. 107).
9 Chapter 5 contains an intriguing account of unfolding events surrounding the Yunnan
Province Nu River Dam project(s). The dispute began in 2003 and remains unresolved
today. A key policy entrepreneur was the environmental NGO Green Watershed, led by
Yu Xiagang. A remarkable individual in many respects, Yu and environmental activist/
journalist Wang Yongchen – who was already involved in the Dujiangyan controversy –
masterfully  employed  and  widened  the  space  provided  by  legal  regulations  and
informal  political  conventions.  They  documented  and  revealed  information  and
perspectives on the issue at stake (e.g.,  by letting a representative of local peasants
speak at an international conference on the topic, and by distributing films of resettled,
uncompensated locals without land who have to make a living by collecting rubbish)
that  government  officials  normally  took  pains  to  keep  out  of  public  sight.  In  the
process, the national media began to intensively report on the issue. Other NGOs, the
Ministry of Environmental Protection, individuals from other government agencies, a
National People’s Congress delegate, and even Premier Wen chimed in or were drawn
into the issue.
10 Yet,  the  supporting  alliance  did  not  remain  passive,  either.  On  the  local  level,  the
Yunnan authorities were largely able to gag any meaningful critical voices within the
reach  of  their  authority.  Moreover,  the  project  proponents  also  began  to  actively
engage in framing. They found a skilful spokesman in physicist Fang Shimin, who was
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instrumental  in  a  de-legitimation  campaign  that  framed  the  opposition  and  their
arguments as irrational, unscientific, elitist, or self-serving. The author argues that the
scientific  front  in  particular  is  the  resisters‘  “Achilles  heel”  (p.  146).  Scientific
knowledge  is  effectively  under  the  control  of  the  authorities,  and  engaging  in  a
scientifically  informed  debate  is  therefore  impossible.  Mertha  comments  on  this
mechanism by referring to a Foucaultian insight: “Knowledge really is power” (p. 147).
The  opposition’s  framing  attempts  thus  never  dominated  (Mertha’s  sufficient
condition), and the resistance outcome of the episode is much less victorious than in
the preceding case of Dujiangyan.
11 This review will continue by recapturing and further debating some selected points of
Mertha‘s  analysis.  Firstly,  in  the  beginning  section,  the  author  maintains  that  his
examples are “‘critical cases’ in which policy change as a result of bottom up pressure
[were] least likely to occur.” He supports his rationale with “the importance of the
issue and the immense political power of the more ardent supporters of this policy”
(pp. 38-39). However, this argument is only convincing before one has read his analysis;
the book’s insights suggest rather the opposite. Only because of the high stakes and
high profile of these large-scale projects was it possible to initiate a nationwide media
debate on them, which in turn made successful resistance possible. We may assume
that the average industrial project with support from the largely unchecked authority
of local Party secretaries has a very slim chance of being challenged by the mechanisms
Mertha outlines.  While  this  does  not  negate  the importance of  his  analysis,  it  may
indicate that the cases are critical in a different way that remains to be defined.
12 Secondly,  it  seems  that  some  assumptions  of  the  theoretical  approaches  Mertha
employs are not fully in line with his actual analytical results. For example, the author
maintains  that  the  main function of  frames is  to  mobilise  (p.  14),  and that  frames
therefore need to resonate with the general public. However, this function seems not
entirely apparent in his analysis. Who is actually mobilised by the frame that defeated
the project in Dujiangyan? The frame might have resonated, but how do we know that
(p. 108), and why is it decisive? Yet, Mertha also hints at another function of frames
when he introduces the concept. Frames can de-legitimate or “overwhelm the official
state  frame”  (p.  23)  of  a  policy. What  is  decisive  seems  to  be  the  de-legitimising
function rather than resonance, not to mention the mobilisation part of the equation.
However,  the  relationship  between  framing, political  power,  the  state,  and  its
legitimatory discourse is still a largely neglected issue in framing theory. The approach
is primarily concerned with the discursive interaction between social movement actors
and their (potentially mobilisable) constituent audience. This might call for theoretical
expansion beyond framing in future analyses of discursive resistance in China.
13 In the concluding Chapter 6,  Mertha compares his  work to that  of  O’Brien and Li,6
pointing out differences with their work that will not be disputed here. However, this
reviewer  thinks  both  approaches  share  a  common  key  insight  that  might  deserve
further  attention.  Both  monographs  highlight  how power  can  be  subverted  by  the
means  of  language,  by  juxtaposing  the  actual  practice  of  power  with  legitimatory
principles  of  higher  order  that  the  Chinese  state  claims  guide  the  exercise  of  its
authority.  The  more  public  this  attack  with  legitimatory  claims,  the  stronger  the
political momentum.
14 This leads to another fundamental issue highlighted by Mertha’s analysis. Convincing
accounts of  successful  resistance against  powerful  opponents must explain how the
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seemingly  powerless  may  overcome  the  powerful.  Mainstream  scholarship  from
contentious politics, for example, solves this basic problem by empowering actors with
resources  (resource  mobilisation)  or  political  opportunities  that  make  the  coercive
capacity of the state less of a threat. Since the 1980s, framing theory adds discursive
meaning-work as  an aid  to  mobilising  supporters.  What  all  these  concepts  have  in
common is that they perceive power and its resistance essentially in material terms.
When contenders have resources, exploit opportunities, or appear in large numbers, it
seems  more  plausible  that  they  can  overcome  a  materially  powerful  opponent.
However,  the  crucial  part  of  Mertha’s  study  does  not  indicate  that  this  type  of
empowerment is decisive. Conversely, his resisters are not empowered with resources,
nor do they rely on strength in numbers. Although his contenders are not independent
of  what  he  calls  fragmentation  and  what  might  also  be  analysed  as  political
opportunity, he shows that fragmentation needs to be made into an opportunity by
policy  entrepreneurs  who  engage  in  meaning-making.  In  the  final  analysis,  the
subversion of the mighty Chinese state seems to depend crucially on manipulating the
meaningful sphere of politics. Power is overcome by contenders who are empowered
symbolically rather than materially.
15 Consequently, China’s Water Warriors might indicate that analyses of Chinese politics
(at least those seeking to understand the potential for bottom- up policy and political
change) might need to broaden their theoretical scope and take political power and
resistance  against  it  more  seriously  in  its  symbolic/linguistic  dimensions.  It  seems
Mertha’s  research  highlights  the  enduring  utility  of  Stuart  Hall’s  1982  insight  that
emphasises: “The more one accepts that how people will act will depends in part on
how the situations in which they act are defined, and the less one can assume either a
natural meaning to everything or a universal consensus on what things mean – then
the more important […] becomes the process by which certain events get […] signified
in certain ways. […]
16 The power involved here  is  an ideological  power:  the  power to  signify  events  in  a
certain  way.”7 Andrew  C.  Mertha’s  study  is  a  thought-provoking  piece  of  research
firmly grounded in detailed fieldwork. It opens the door to an understanding of the
Chinese political process that seems underresearched. China’s Water Warriors should
be part of the standard literature for anybody interested in the fields of Chinese policy
studies, contentious politics,  environmental politics,  and Chinese politics in general.
Given the author’s fresh approach to the subject, the book has the potential to inspire
further studies.
NOTES
1. Stuart Hall, “The Rediscovery of ‘Ideology’: The Return of the Repressed in Media
Studies,” in Culture, Society, and the Media, Michael Gurevitch (ed), London, Methuen,
1982, pp. 56-90.
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2. He mentions that the latter two often have a particularly close relationship or even
work in personal union (pp. 10-11, 13).
3. Mertha describes the formation of this coalition by highlighting that the frame or
discourse“link[s] these entrepreneurs to another” (p. 16). Yet, later he follows Sabatier,
who argues that the coalition is linked by a “set of normative and causal beliefs” (p. 17,
also p. 156). It may be noted here that his initial argument, which highlights discursive
linkage, is largely in line with Hajer’s concept of discourse coalitions. Hajer, however,
explicitly criticizes Sabatier’s assumption of shared norms and beliefs. Particularly in
the Dujiangyan case it is obvious that the shared norms and beliefs assumption is very
difficult to uphold. Here Mertha provides no reasons to assume that the anti-dam
coalition is bound together by anything but the shared goal to obstruct the dam project
and by the discursive frame that was wrapped around it. (Maarten A. Hajer, The Politics
of Environmental Discourse, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 68 ff.).
4. This raises the question of why appeals to social justice seem to be so highly effective
when, for example, retired workers fight for their pensions. (William Hurst and Kevin J.
O’Brien, “China’s Contentious Pensioners,” The China Quarterly, vol. 170, n° June, 2002,
pp. 345-60)
5. This dam has recently been debated as a possible trigger for the 2008 earthquake.
6. O’Brien, Kevin and Lianjiang Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2006.
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